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The Establishment Clause As A Structural Restraint:
Validations and Ramifications
Carl H. Esbeck *
I.
Constantine converted to Christianity in 312 A.D. while commanding
a Roman army in a complex series of civil wars. As Western Emperor,
he issued the Edict of Milan in 313 A.D. which legalized Christianity
and restored property taken during persecution. Constantine also
dedicated Constantinople in 330 A.D. as a "second Rome" and thereby
created a rival political and religious center. By late in the fourth
century Christianity had slowly but surely become the official religion of
the empire.
While the resulting church and empire were
organizationally distinct, they formed but two aspects of a single whole
that we now call Christendom. It was understood that these two centers
of authority, sacred and secular, would, on the one hand, cooperate in
upholding and defending the church, and, on the other, Christian
belief provided those presuppositional truths that unified and gave
legitimacy to the empire.
A second administrative head, led by the patriarch of
Constantinople, served the church in the eastern empire. In 1054 A.D.,
that division ripened into a doctrinal schism that severed the eastern
church from both Western Civilization and the Catholic Church
centered at Rome. While Eastern Orthodoxy remained the established
church in eastern Europe, early on the Byzantium rite was subordinated
to the princes and temporal powers. In contrast, the Church at Rome
remained a co-equal power, at times dominating monarchs, absolute
and constitutional, and at times being dominated by them. Through it
all the Roman Church retained, more or less, the unity of Christendom
within a shifting network of European geopolitical diversity. This
prevailing dualism between the spiritual and the temporal authority was
uniquely Western. While the period is most often remembered for the
Roman Church's control over sacraments being wielded to visit
* Isabella Wade & Paul C. Lyda Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
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deprivations upon civil rulers, it is more fair to say that the church
preserved classical culture and nurtured the liberal arts, as well as
ameliorated the harshness of peasant life, while the competing legal
systems contributed immeasurably to the development of greater
freedom for the masses.
In 1517, the German priest, Martin Luther, nailed his Ninety-five
Theses to the door of Wittenberg Church. The resulting Reformation
shattered the unity of Western Catholic Christianity. The conflagration
that ensued lasted for over 130 years, a period that today we refer to as
the "religious wars." But that is imposing a modern construct on the
conflict. For the combatants, there was no pronounced demarcation
between the civil and the religious. Rather, what unified the political
core of each state was its religious worldview. An interim settlement was
reached at the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, with the adoption of the
simple, if crude, principle of cujos regio, ejus religio (whose region, his
religion). The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, ending the Thirty Years'
War, left Catholics in control of the south and Protestants established in
the north. The horror and dissipation of the wars strengthened the
hand of the secular rulers at the expense of the churches, and this was
especially so in the case of Protestants because of their many divisions
and their greater dependence on the military protection of the prince.
The Westphalian settlement that emerged from these wars was
sovereign nation-states, established churches, and religious dissenters.
Dissenters were often persecuted or driven into exile, in large measure
because the presence of nonconformists within the political polity was
thought to destabilize the state. The persecution was always at the
hands of the state, but the churches were complicit. Growing
abhorrence with the violence wrought by religious persecution, as well
as the emerging influence of the Enlightenment and the stubbornness
of dissenters even unto death, caused the pattern to evolve yet again in
the direction of sovereign states, established churches, and toleration of
dissenting sects. The British Act of Toleration (1689), for example, was
adopted at the time of the Glorious Revolution and extended legal
protection to non-Anglican Protestants.
Initially a matter of
pragmatism and prudence, toleration was later invoked as a natural
right. Such were the church/state patterns and adjustments brought to
all the British colonies in America, in variations both strong and weak,
except for the special case of Rhode Island and, partly at least,
Pennsylvania.
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That brings matters up to America's early nationhood period and
this country's one truly unique contribution to government theory.
Unlike the French Revolution that first set out to destroy the church
and then settled for anti-clericalism, between the 1780s and the early
1830s the American states, each in their own way, set about
disestablishing the church for the good of the church. That is,
disestablishment was advanced principally by the religiously fervent
seeking greater freedom, not for freedom's sake, but for the sake of
purer religion. The coercion of others in matters of faith was believed
to be a violation of genuine religion. Further, true religion, the
disestablishmentarians taught, required the absence of government
involvement-even a government's well-meaning attempts to support
the church. Politics was properly of limited reach, with a voluntary
church and confessional religion beyond its grasp.
So in a sharp break with all Europe, American's innovation in
church/state relations took place during this roughly 50-year period,
with each state proceeding along a different path and at a different
pace. Once the nation had put behind it the social disruption of the
Revolution, there also occurred a veritable burst in growth byProtestant
denominations, notably Methodists and Baptists, during a period of
religious enthusiasm, now known as the Second Great Awakening, that
overlapped with disestablishment and which did not fade until the early
1840s.
These newer, growing bodies were individualistic and
voluntaristic, no respecters of privilege, not adverse to spinning off
societies to missionize outside the church, and hence ready adapters of
the new American ethos.
The American new pattern, that was disestablishment's objective, was
to form limited states under written constitutions, a culture that sparked
self-governing and self-supporting churches and mission societies, and
the observance of voluntaryism in matters of individual belief and
practice. Matters of ecclesiastical cognizance, such as creeds, forms of
worship, church governance, clerical qualifications, and discipline of
church members, were-in modern parlance-deregulated, no longer
subject to the state's superintending control or the object of its active
attention. This new pattern did not mean the states were indifferent to
religion. Rather, while foreswearing any claim to coercive measures
concerning doctrinal belief or observance of regular worship, the
influence of churches over public affairs by way of the moral goods
inculcated in their members continued to be taken for granted.
Indeed, such influence was notjust assumed but often welcomed, for
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religion was thought central to the formation of a citizenry with the
virtues and mores to sustain the republic. It was believed that the state
drew legitimacy from, and operated under, a moral canopy that was not
of its own making. Hence, we often see quoted the passage byAlexis de
Tocqueville which memorably describes America of the 1830s, to the
effect that religion was America's foremost political institution even
though the churches had no regular contact with the state or any
official role in it.'
The American disestablishment-as an idea, or, better, as a
movement-thus posited that political unity and stability are not
dependent on the sharing of a single religious creed, or even similar
creeds such as those common to Protestants. These Americans had
come to believe that the higher-order truths governing human
destiny-the purpose of life, the question of immortality, whether there
is an ultimate cause behind the natural order-are intrinsically religious
and thus outside the competence of the civil realm. While not within
the state's jurisdiction, it was further appreciated that these higherorder truths do bear directly upon the formation of those second-order
beliefs concerning human rights, the rule of law, self determination
through the ballot, honest dealing with one's neighbors, and unselfish
public service. These second-order beliefs are operative at the level of
political life and necessary to build a consensus, more narrow in scope
and shorter in duration, in order that the republic can function and
resolve its internal policy debates. However, the nation in its better
moments, at times of real testing, will draw upon the higher truth-claims
and spiritual resources of its citizens, the inculcation and cultivation of
which are not among the nation's constitutionally delegated powers.
To be sure, the machinery of checks and balances, pitting one faction to
offset another, will cancel out many of the blows from humanity's baser
instincts. But if we are to have a republic that can successfully rally in
times of great trial or emergency, America has to be able to rely, as in
the past, on common citizens who respond with uncommon virtue.
Shortly after the Constitutional Convention of 1787 had adjourned,
Benjamin Franklin is said to have replied to a curious citizen, "Madam,
we give you a republic, if you can keep it." Thus, from the outset, the
American government was known to be an ongoing experiment
dependent on the character of its people. It remains so. Os Guinness
1 Alexis

de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 305 (Francis Bowen & Phillips Bradley eds.,

Knopf 1945) (1851).
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wonderfully describes this system as "gravity defying," because it is
dependent upon its many "unofficial faiths" to inculcate virtues,
spiritually rooted, and over which the American government is
2
constitutionally barred from any promotion or superintending control.
II.

There were three or four major steps in the changing church/state
paradigm from Constantine through America's disestablishment
period. Each step along the way always operated at two levels. The first
level was the division of power as between the nation-state and the
church. The second was the relationship of the civil state to people of
faith. During America's formative disestablishment period, those
arguing that all churches must be free of the state sought to place limits
on government authority that would yield, as they saw it, the mutual
good and security of both church and state. On the temporal side, the
benefit was to avoid sectarian divisions erupting into violence whenever
there is a clash of parties or politics. On the spiritual side, the benefit
was greater autonomy for churches and related voluntary societies,
including noninterference in their practices, pronouncements, polity,
and personnel, and hence religion more worthy of respect.
Once disestablishment was achieved in the states, it was perhaps
inevitable that the principles behind the hard-won balance of limited
government, free churches, and individual voluntaryism in religious
observance, would be read back into the existing matrix of the nation's
founding charter. The obvious vehicle of choice was the religion text in
the First Amendment, with the Establishment Clause absorbing
disestablishment's settlement on the jurisdictional division between
church and state, 3 and the Free Exercise Clause absorbing the
2

0s Guinness, TIHEAMERICAN HOUR: A TIME OF RECKONING AND THE ONCE AND FUTURE ROLE

OF FAITH 18-19 (1993).
3 In McGowan v. Maryland,366 U.S. 420, 465-66 (1961),Justice Frankfurter summarized the
matter this way in his concurrence:

The purpose of the Establishment Clause was to assure that the national
legislature would not exert its power in the service of any purely religious
end; that it would not, as Virginia and virtually all of the Colonies had done,
make of religion, as religion, an object of legislation ...
.. The Establishment Clause withdrew from the sphere of legitimate
legislative concern and competence a specific, but comprehensive, area of
human conduct:
man's belief or disbelief in the verity of some

HeinOnline -- 18 J.L. & Pol. 449 2002

Journalof Law & Politics

[Vol.XVIII:2

settlement concerning coercion and a believer's conscious. This project
of "reading into" the Amendment's text would not begin in earnest
until the mid-twentieth century. Moreover, the effort behind this
project would be primarily judicial, the lower federal-courts following
the Supreme Court's lead. With the principles of the disestablishment
period being given, for the first time, their full implication, the
principles often ran counter to local, typically Protestant, custom and
practice.
Although the 50-year state-by-state disestablishment had little to do
with the First Amendment at the time, because it's the Amendment's
text later came to bear disestablishment's imprint we need to go back
and briefly trace its history. In September of 1789, the First Congress
reported out twelve proposed articles of amendment to the
Constitution, the third article reading in part, "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." This article became the First Amendment when, in
late 1791, the requisite number of states had ratified only the third
through the twelfth articles. The first of the religion texts, the noestablishment clause, underwent little serious exploration by the U.S.
Supreme Court until 1947, in the decision of Everson v. Board of
Education,4 the Establishment Clause was incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment and made applicable to state and local
governments. 5 One year later, when the no-establishment principle was
transcendental idea and man's expression in action of that belief or disbelief.
Congress may not make these matters, as such, the subject of legislation, nor,
now, may any legislature in this country.
4 330 U.S. 1 (1947)

(upholding law providing reimbursement to parents for cost of

transporting children to religious schools).
5 In The SelectiveDraft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1918), the Court summarily rejected an
argument that religious exemptions from the military draft for ministers and theological students,
as well as for members of certain pacifistic sects, was an establishment of religion.

In Watson v.

Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871), the Court held that courts must defer to the decrees of ecclesiastical
adjudicators concerning the resolution of religious disputes. Without explicitly referencing the
Establishment Clause, the Watson Court said that "the rule of action which should govern the civil
courts [is] founded in a broad and sound view of the relations of church and state under our
system of laws ... " Id. at 727.
Five of the Court's opinions before Everson gave only passing reference to the Establishment
Clause in obiter dicta. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943); Minnersville Sch. Dist.
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Hamilton v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 265-66 (1934) (Cardozo, J., concurring); Davis v.
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157 years old, the Court found, for the first time, a violation of the
clause. The case, McCollum v. Board ofEducation,6 involved the teaching

of religion in a local public school.
The Free Exercise Clause has a longer history of serious engagement
by the Supreme Court, albeit the Court has never embraced its
principle with enthusiasm. In the nineteenth century, Mormons in the
Utah Territory sought the protection of the clause, without success,
from federal efforts to wipe out polygamy. 7 In the first half of the
twentieth century, religious pacifists, in order to avoid military service 8
or meet the qualifications for naturalization, 9 sought refuge, with little
effect, in free-exercise arguments. First incorporated in 1940 through
the Fourteenth Amendment, 10 the Free Exercise Clause had some
1
success against employment security laws starting with Sherbert v. Verner."
12
That ended abruptly with the decision in Employment Division v. Smith,

Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345 (1890). But the five references shed no light on the clause's meaning.
Hence, prior to the Everson decision in 1947, in only two cases had the Supreme Court squarely
addressed the meaning of the Establishment Clause. In Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 81-82
(1908), the Court sustained a congressional use of Indian tribal funds, held in trust by the
government and disbursed to pay for expenses at a Roman Catholic mission school chosen by the
parents of the Indian students.

In Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 295-300 (1899), the Court

upheld the use of federal funds for constructing a building for a Roman Catholic hospital located
in the District of Columbia.
6 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
7 See, e.g., Late Corp. of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 136
U.S. 1 (1890) (upholding revocation of Mormon Church charter and confiscation of its property);
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (upholding conviction for falsely taking oath to the effect that
accused was not a member of polygamous organization); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885)
(upholding federal law disenfranchising polygamists); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878) (upholding federal law criminalizing polygamy).
8 See, e.g., In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945) (upholding a denial to grant admission to bar
because of applicant's refusal to take an oath to effect that he was willing to serve in militia);
Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (denying right to attend state
university without enrolling in required course in military training).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931) (upholding bar to naturalization because
of refusal to bear arms in defense of nation); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931)
(same); United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929) (same).
10 SeeCantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (overturning conviction for breach of the
peace based on defendant's religious solicitations).
1

374 U.S. 398

(1963)

(applying strict scrutiny to state's denial of unemployment

compensation to Seventh-day Adventist who refused Saturday employment).
12 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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which held that there was no primafacie claim under the Free Exercise
Clause when a religiously neutral, generally applicable law has a
disparate effect on someone's religious practice. Apart from pure belief
(as opposed to actions stemming from belief), following the decision in
Smith the Free Exercise Clause calls for strict scrutiny only when a
statute or other legal restraint intentionally discriminates against a
religion, a religious practice, or against an individual because of his or
her religion.' 3 The real workhorse for religious liberty has been the
Free Speech Clause. Early in the last century free-speech rights
protected the socially marginalized Jehovah's Witnesses, 14 and in
modern times expressional rights are the means-of-choice for
challenging viewpoint and content discrimination targeted at Christian
evangelicals. 5
As noted previously, the West, from Constantine through the
American disestablishment, responded to the religion question at two
levels: one, thejurisdictional struggle as between state and church; and,
two, the relationship of the state to persons of faith. The historical
sweep in Part I, combined with the brief survey of the case-law directly
above, are prologue to twin observations about the Supreme Court's
modern application of the First Amendment. First, the Supreme Court
has, with respect to outcomes as distinct from its stated rationale,
applied the Establishment Clause as limiting the government's authority
with respect to religion and houses of worship (in the vernacular
"separation of church and state") and thus applied the clause as a
structural restraint on government power. Hence, no-establishment
acts to circumscribe the government's power rather than to vest in
individuals a personal right. This makes sense from the long historical
13 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City ofHialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (striking
down ordinance that discriminated against the ritual sacrifice of animals, a religious practice of the
claimant targeted by the city); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)

(striking down state

constitutional clause that intentionally discriminated against clerics seeking elective public office).
14 See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (striking down ban on distribution of
religious handbills); Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (same); Lovell v. City of
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (striking down ordinance prohibiting distribution of literature).
15 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (viewpoint
discrimination); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(same); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (same);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (content discrimination); cf Westside Board of Educ. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (plurality opinion in part) (upholding the Equal Access Act, which
grants a right of equal access for student religious clubs at public secondary schools).
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perspective, with the no-establishment text becoming the juridical
bearer of the division of jurisdiction between state and church as it
evolved in the West. Second, the modern Court has interpreted the
Free Exercise Clause as safeguarding individuals from religious harm at
the hands of the government. This also makes sense from the long
sweep of historical development, with the free-exercise text becoming
the juridical bearer of the West's emerging solicitude for preventing the
abridgement of an individual's religious practice when not clearly
deleterious to society.
III.
It is commonplace that the United States Constitution consists of
rights and structure. If the Establishment Clause is indeed regarded by
the modern Supreme Court as a structural restraint-not an individual
right-this should be evident in the cases. Before proceeding to several
valaditions of that proposition, it will be useful to spend some time
differentiating rights from structure.
Rights vest in individuals. 16 Absent a showing of actual or threatened
injury-in-fact, an individual's right is not violated. For example, a
showing of burden or impending harm to one's faith is required to
invoke the Free Exercise Clause, 17 hence an individual desirous of
16 Rights also vest in aggregates of individuals, which we call groups, organizations, or
associations. Thus, groups have rights in the sense that they have the aggregated ights of the
group's individual members. And, when certain conditions are met, the group has standing to
assert the rights of the collective individuals. Such rules are instrumental, consonant with thejural
status of groups. Individuals, on the other hand, have existence quite apart from any recognition
conferred on them by the positive law. See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishmnent Clause as a Structural
Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 51-58 (1998)

[hereafter cited as "Esbeck,

StructuralRestrain'].
17 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320 (1980) (denying standing to bring free exercise claim in
absence of alleged religious compulsion); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,689 (1971) (rejecting
free exercise claim because there was no evidence of impact on claimants' religious belief or
practice); Board of Educ. V. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 24849 (1968) (holding that free exercise claim
ins without merit in absence of religious burden); Sch. Dist. ofAbington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
221, 223 (1963) (holding that in a free exercise claim it is necessary to show governmental
coercion on the practice of religion; id. at 224 n.9 ("[T] he requirements for standing to challenge
state action under the Establishment Clause, unlike those relating to the Free Exercise Clause, do
not include proof that particular religious freedoms are infringed."); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
431 (1962) (stating that the Establishment Clause goes much further than to relieve coercive
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stating a primafacie claim under the clause must necessarily profess to
having, in the first instance, a religion.
Governments do not have rights. Governments have powers and
18
duties. The federal government is one of enumerated powers.
Structural clauses in the Constitution delegate powers to a government
(federal or state) or to a particular branch of the federal government
(legislative, executive, orjudicial). Separation of powers and federalism
are familiar expressions of these types of constitutional structure.
Rather than affirmative grants of authority, some structural clauses deny
("negative") certain powers to the government or a particular branch
thereof. The Bill of Rights did not delegate to, or vest new powers in,
the federal government. 19 Accordingly, if the Establishment Clause is
pressure on religious belief and practice); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429 (1961)
(denying standing to plead free exercise claim when alleged damages were economic rather than
religious).
18 State governments are not so constrained.

State constitutions generally do not read as

specific delegations of power, but as allocating inherent powers and imposing limitations thereon.
Thomas M. Cooley, A TREATISE ON TIlE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
'

LEGISLATIVE POWER OF TILE STATE OF TIE AMERICAN UNION 11 (7" ed. 1903).
19 The purpose of these early amendments wasjust the reverse of vesting new powers, namely
to deny that the recently formed national government was possessed with certain powers. See
Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833) (observing that a principal
source of opposition to adoption of the original Constitution was the fear that national powers
might be exercised in a manner impairing liberty, thus leading to a proposed Bill of Rights limiting
the powers of the national government).
In a speech before the United States House of Representatives introducing his draft of the
proposed amendments,James Madison described their purpose as follows: "the great object in view
is to limit and qualify the powers of Government, by excepting out of the grant of power those
cases in which the Government ought not to act, or to act only in a particular mode." 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. 454 Uoseph Gales ed., 1789). In The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1870), the Supreme
Court observed:
The preamble to the [congressional] resolution submitting [the Bill of Rights
to the states] for adoption recited that the "conventions of a number of the
states had, at the time of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire,
in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of [federal] powers, that further
declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added." . . . Most of [the
proposed] amendments are denials of power which had not been expressly
granted, and which cannot be said to have been necessary and proper for
carrying into execution any other powers. Such, for example, is the
prohibition of any laws respecting the establishment of religion, prohibiting
the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.
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indeed structural it is a clause that was intended to "negative" or deny
20
that the government holds specified power.
For government to avoid violating an individual right is a matter of
constitutional duty owed to each person within its jurisdiction. The
duty is personal, running in favor of each individual. On the other
hand, for government to avoid exceeding a restraint in a constitution's
structure is a duty owed to the entire body politic-which is to say that
the restraints of constitutional structure are impersonal. Another way
to phrase the matter is that rights runs in favor of individuals whereas a
structural "negative" runs against the government. Hence, rights,
because they are personal, can be waived by the rights-holder. Whereas
structure, because it is there to benefit the entire body politic, cannot
be waived.
Structure, to be sure, often has the laudable but indirect
consequence of enlarging the field of operation for the exercise of
individual liberties. It does this by compelling the various branches of
the government (legislative, executive, and judicial) to stay confined
within their proper limits. However, the immediate object of structure
is the management of power: a dividing, dispersing, and balancing of
the various prerogatives of the nation's sovereignty. Not every exercise
of power that exceeds a structural restraint will result in an injury to an
individual. Lack of injury or harm, however, does not discount the fact
that a constitutional restraint was exceeded. For example, what if the
Senate was to forego its power to give "advice and consent" to the
President concerning a highly popular appointment to the federal
bench, thus effectively permitting a judicial nominee to assume an
Article III judgship without an approving Senate vote. No one is
harmed beyond the generalized grievance that the law was not followed.
Yet, the Advice and Consent Clause is not waivable by the Senate, for
that power is vested in the Senate for the benefit of the whole American
people.

Id. at 535.

The Preamble in its entirety is reproduced at 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 40
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). See also United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 674-75
(1998) (stating that the received understanding of the Bill of Rights is that it was instituted to
restrict the powers of the national government).
20 A court enforcing the clause would inquire into whether a law or official's action is one
"respecting an establishment of religion." If that inquiry is answered in the affirmative, then the
no-establishment restraint was exceed and the law or official's action is unconstitutional.
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The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause cases since Everson are
roundly criticized as being contradictory or in hopeless disarray by
parties on all sides of the First Amendment debate. That poses the
question whether viewing the Establishment Clause as structural would
better systematize the cases. The "proofs" or validations that follow
indicate that, indeed, the Court's cases are far more easily classified and
understood when the Establishment Clause is viewed not as an
individual right, but as a structural "negative"on the government's
power.
A. Relaxed Standing Rules
The Supreme Court has carved out a special exception to normal
standing requirements for actions brought by federal taxpayers. The
exception has been invoked successfully only when pleading claims
under the Establishment Clause. The special exception would be
unnecessary if the clause was a constitutional right. Rights are personal
and thereby run in favor individuals, so when a right is violated
someone is harmed. That means the requisite injury-in-fact would be
present to satisfy ordinary standing requirements.
Not so with structure. Being impersonal, a structural violation does
not always result in a harm or injury to someone. Structural violations
that result in no injury-in-fact are not uncommon. 21 When this occurs,
the Supreme Court has ruled that claims pleading the constitutional
violation are nonjusticiable for lack of standing. This is so whether the
claimant's asserted interest has been as taxpayer, citizen, or some other
complainant raising a "generalized grievance" held in common with
many others. 22 It is not the large class of potential claimants that deters
the Court; the problem is that the claimant seeks no more remedy than
that the government be ordered to obey the law.
21 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974)
(denying standing to plaintiff who claimed that the Incompatibility Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 6,
cl. 2, prohibits members of Congress from holding an office in the executive branch); United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (denying standing to plaintiff who claimed that the
Account Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 7, required Congress to disclose the details of
appropriation to the Central Intelligence Agency); Ex pare Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937)

(per

curiam) (denying standing to plaintiff who claimed that the Incompatibiltiy Clause prohibits a
member of Congress from accepting an appointment in the judicial branch).
22 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982).
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If the Establishment Clause is structural, one would expect to find
instances where the no-establishment restraint is exceeded even in the
absence of someone incurring a harm or injury-in-fact. Instances are
indeed found in cases such as Flast v. Cohen,23 where the claimant's
putative "injury" was as a federal taxpayer. Rather than dismissing Flast
as a "generalized grievance" case and thus lacking in standing, as would
be expected, the Supreme Court fashioned a legal fiction of
individualized "taxpayer injury" in order that the courts could entertain
the lawsuit and proceed to a resolution on the merits. 24 The point here
is not to debate the wisdom of the Court-fashioned exception in Flast to
normative rules of standing. The point is that no-establishment was
regarded by the Court as behaving like a structural clause, capable of
having its limits exceeded and yet causing no individualized injury-in23 392 U.S. 83 (1968).

There are additional instances of the Court relaxing standing

requirements in Establishment Clause cases (see Esbeck, sLpra note 16, at 37-40), but the federal
taxpayer standing cases are the most clear.
24 F/ast, 392 U.S. at 101-102, Federal taxpayers have no personal, religious right to prevent
monies from being disbursed to a religious organization that is providing an educational service
pursuant to a general program of public aid. The reputed legal claim by such a taxpayer would be
that he or she has a right not to be coerced against conscience or otherwise "religiously offended"
when tax monies end up going to a religious school. The idea has a certain superficial appeal, but
the law is to the contrary and for good reason. The Supreme Court has refused to recognize a
federal taxpayer claim of religious coercion or other free-exercise harm. In Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672 (1971), plaintiffs claimed that payment of a general federal tax, the monies of which
were later appropriated to faith-based colleges, caused them religious coercion in violation of the
Free Exercise Clause. Finding no plausible evidence of compulsion, the Court held that a federal
taxpayer's cause of action for religious coercion failed to state a claim under the free exercise
clause. Id. at 689. In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982), plaintiffs challenged as violative of the Establishment Clause the transfer
of government surplus property to a religious college. The Supreme Court rebuffed all asserted
bases of standing because the plaintiffs lacked the requisite personal "injury in fact." One of the
rejected assertions was that the plaintiffs had a "spiritual stake" in not having their government give
away property to a religious organization or to otherwise act in a manner contrary to noestablishment values. The Court rejected that argument and held that a spiritual stake in having
one's government comply with the Establishment Clause is not, on the merits of the claim a
juridically cognizable injury. Id. at 486 n. 22. Taxes of citizens and taxpayers generally support all
manner of policies and programs with which those individuals may deeply disagree. Taxes pay the
salaries of public officials whose policies individuals may oppose. None of these complaints give
rise to constitutionally cognizable "injuries" to federal taxpayers. There is no reason that a federal
taxpayer alleging "religious coercion" or being "religiously offended" should, on the merits of the
claim, be treated any differently.
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fact. The educational funding program at issue in Flastwasregarded as
an instance of government exceeding a limit on its power, or arguably
so, and yet not resulting in any pecuniary loss or other particularized
injury-in-fact.
B. Non-Religious Remedies
Structure does have the consequential effect of protecting individual
liberties, but that is a happy byproduct of structure's primary object of
keeping government power properly checked and in its place. If the
Establishment Clause is structural, there is no reason that the liberties
indirectly safeguarded by the clause would be limited to religious
liberty. Thus, one would expect to find no-establishment cases where
someone does incur a loss of liberty but the nature of the loss is nonreligious. There are cases of the type expected, such as those involving
economic harm or loss of property, 25 constraints on academic
27
freedom, 2 6 and burdens on a free-thinking atheist.
25 SeeEstate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (upholding claim of department
store against labor law); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (upholding claim of
tavern seeking issuance of a liquor license); cf McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430-31 (1961)
(permitting claim of economic harm by retail stores to be free of Sunday-closing law, but ultimately
ruling against the stores on the merits); Two Guys from Harrison Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366
U.S. 582 (1961) (same).
26 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down a state law that required
teaching of creation in public school science classes if evolution is taught); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968) (striking down a state prohibition on teaching evolution in public school
science classes).
27 SeeTorcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). In Torcaso, an atheist who otherwise qualified
for a public office refused to take a required oath that professed belief in God. The Court held the
oath requirement violative of the First Amendment without specifying either religion clause. If an
individual objects to the oath out of a religious belief that forbids taking oaths, then he has a valid
claim under the Free Exercise Clause. As an atheist, however, the claimant in Torcaso did not
(indeed, by definition could not) suffer a religious injury as he professed to have no religious
beliefs. Nevertheless, for a state to mandate taking of the oath would be a violation of the
Establishment Clause as to all office seekers, including atheists, because confession of belief in a
deity is a subject that remains in the realm of religion.
Atheists and agnostics are sensibly protected as well by the Free Speech Clause, for the rights
implicated are freedom to believe and freedom to refrain from speaking. Injoseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), the Court found violative of free speech rights a law permitting
censorship of films found to be "sacrilegious." The Court could have reached the same result
under the Free Exercise Clause if the film producer sought to convey a religious belief, either
about his own faith or a theological criticism of the faith of others. However, the Court also could
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By virtue of these cases that grant relief for non-religious harm, it is
also apparent that the Court has the Establishment Clause doing work
not being done by the Free Exercise Clause. Given that there are two
religion clauses in the First Amendment, it would be redundant if they
were both dedicated to safeguarding individual religious rights. The
presence of cases redressing economic harm or academic freedom
confirms that the Court is not envisioning the no-establishment
principle in the role of a constitutional right that protects individuals
from religious injury. That is the role of the Free Exercise Clause,
indeed its singular role. The Establishment Clause, in the Court's
application, has a different role, and that role would appear to be as a
structural "negative" on power.
C. Class-Wide Remedies
The remedy in no-establishment cases is typically class-wide
injunctive relief.28 Such a remedy is aimed far more at negating the
power of government than at affording victim-specific relief to the
actual complainants. That makes sense only if the Establishment Clause
is structural.
The school prayer and devotional Bible-reading cases of the early
960
1
s illustrate the point. In Engel v. Vitale,29 the Court struck down the
practice of teacher-led prayer in New York public schools. Similarly, in
School District ofAbington Township v. Schempp,30 the Court struck down a
public school practice of classroom prayer and devotional Bible
reading. In both cases, the remedy ordered was to enjoin the religious
exercises altogether, as opposed to more narrowly directing school
authorities to permit the student/plaintiffs to opt out of the practice.
Compare that relief with West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,31 where the children ofJehovah's Witnesses were compelled, at

have struck down the censorship law under the Establishment Clause and done so regardless of
whether the film producer sought to convey a religious or secular message, for a no-establishment
transgression does not have as its object the redress of personal religious injury.
28 By "class-wide" relief, I do not mean a remedy that follows in a successful case certified as a
class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I simply mean an

equitable remedy that directly addresses, and provides relief to, a definable group of persons
beyond the successful complainants.
29 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
30 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
31 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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the beginning of each school day, to stand next to their desks, salute the
U.S. flag, and recite the Pledge of Allegiance. The Barnette Court held
that the compulsory exercise implicated the right "not to speak"
contrary to one's beliefs, a violation of the Free Speech Clause. The
remedy, however, was a mere ability to opt out while remaining in the
classroom as other students continued their daily performance of the
patriotic exercise. The constitutional offense was "stopped," in the
Court's view, when theJehovah's Witnesses were permitted to remain in
their seats. The children were not spared any humiliation or peer
pressure as a result of their nonconformity. The remedy to the freespeech violation was specific to the rights holder. Not so with the
Establishment Clause offenses of prayer and devotionals, which resulted
in school-wide injunctions. That is, students not parties to the lawsuits
were also to halt the prayer and devotional practices. Indeed, even
those students who eagerly sought the refreshment of prayer and
Scripture had to stop the class exercises.
The Court, following Engel and Schempp, was immediately criticized
for finding a rights violation in the absence of any proof of coercion,
and then compounding the mistake by awarding an unsought remedy
for those students who did not seek the end of the prayer. The criticism
would be well-founded if the Court was enforcing an individual right.
But if the enforcement was of a structural restraint, the Court's classwide remedy was entirely proper. If Engel and Schempp were rights
violations, the focus of the remedy would have been specific to the
plaintiffs. Rights run in favor of individuals. But if the violations were
structural, the focus of the remedy properly would be on the
government and getting its officials back within their constitutional
limits. Hence, for structural violations the remedy is to grant relief to
the entire class of individuals in the "zone of impact" of the structural
32
violation-whether all those in the "zone" want the remedy or not.
32 Much the same observations can be made with respect to cases such as Fla&t v. Cohen.and the
nature of the remedy in taxpayer-standing cases. Normally the remedy for a fights violation is to
"make whole" the individual claimant and nothing more. In contrast, the remedy for successful
claimants in taxpayer-standing cases is not a refund of tax dollars improperly diverted in order to
return the money to the taxpayer's pocket.

Nor is the remedy a sum of money calculated to

compensate for the religious injury incurred when the claimant had to support with their own
money the religion of others. Rather, the remedy in these cases is "class-wide relief" to all within
the government's jurisdiction-namely, to enjoin all future legislative violations of the noestablishment restraint. This is not the person-specific remedy of a rights violation. Rather, a class-
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D. Subject MatterJurisdictionDismissals

Cases touching on inherently religious questions, such as doctrinal
disputes or defrocking a cleric, often lead to dismissals for lack of
subject matterjurisdiction; and this, when nothing in Article III of the
Constitution limits the power of the federaljudiciary over such cases or
controversies.3 3 A jurisdictional dismissal is a concession that the
subject in dispute is not within the court's constitutional power or
competence. Of course, there is nothing in Article III that denies
jurisdiction over religious disputes. Rather, the courts reference the
First Amendment as the basis for the dismissal. That makes sense only
if the Establishment Clause is structural. That also explains why state
courts refrain from taking subject matter jurisdiction over disputes
involving inherently religious questions. While the jurisdiction of state
courts is not limited by Article III, since its incorporation in the Everson
decision these courts are restrained by the Establishment Clause.
The Supreme Court defined the core of the government's subject
34
matter "negation" in Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral.
Constitutional

constraints on civil government, said the KedroffCourt, acknowledged "a
spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from
secular control or manipulation-in short, power to decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government
as well as those of faith and doctrine. 3 5 The jurisdictional bar to
wide remedy is one correcting a situation where government has exceeded its power-to the
detriment of all within the body politic.
33 See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713-14 (1976) (holding that
courts have no authority to decide ecclesiastical issues); Watson v.Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 732-34 (1871)
(same). The Court does not always use the word "jurisdiction" in its rationale, but its language of
dismissal carries the same meaning. See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445-47 (1969) ("[It is] wholly inconsistent with the American
concept of the relationship between church and state to permit civil courts to determine
ecclesiastical questions," hence the First Amendment's "language leaves the civil courts no role in

determining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving property disputes."); Bouldin v.
Alexander, 82 U.S. 131, 139 (1872) ("This is not a question of membership of the church, nor of
the rights of members as such. It may be conceded that we have no power to revise or question
ordinary acts of church discipline, or of excision from membership.").
34 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (holding unconstitutional a state's undertaking to transfer control of
Russian Orthodox Church from central governing authorities in U.S.S.R. to authorities in New

York).
35 Id. at 116.

HeinOnline -- 18 J.L. & Pol. 461 2002

462

Journalof Law & Politics

[Vol.XVIII:2

deciding religious disputes is not limited to lawsuits between schismatic
factions contending over the possession of church real estate. Rather,
the jurisdictional restraint extends to all litigation whenever a question
appears concerning a matter that is inherently religious, including such
issues arising in lawsuits involving torts,3 6 contracts, 37 and criminal
fraud.38
The "ministerial exemption" from federal and state
employment nondiscrimination statutes is also reflective of the
reluctance of courts to thrust theirjurisdictional oversight into matters
wholly within the province of religious organizations. 39 Additionally,
36 See, e.g., Klagsbrun v. Va'ad Harabonim of Greater Monsey, 53 F. Supp. 2d 732 (D.N.J. 1999),
(subject-matterjurisdiction dismissal of libel and slander claim filed against church), aff(d 263 F.3d
158 (3d Cir. 2001); Farley v. Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 821 F. Supp. 1286 (D.Minn.
1993) (dismissing defamation action against church where the offensive statements arose out f
church controversy); Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 683 A.2d 808, 810-12 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1996) (holding that trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over defamation claim
against church hierarchy); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997) (dismissing claim against
Roman Catholic Diocese for negligent supervision of priest); Tidman v. Salvation Army, 1998 WL
391765 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (dismissing privacy and outrageous conduct tort claims brought by
former employee of faith-based organization discharged for having extramarital affair); In re
Pleasant Glad Assembly of God, 991 S.W. 2d 85 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (subject-matter dismissal of
negligence claims by parishioner brought against church and youth pastor); Korean Presbyterian
Church v. Lee, 880 P.2d 565 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that ecclesiastical abstention doctine
precluded recovery for tort of outrage); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W. 2d 434, 440-41 (Wis. 1997)
(holding that the First Amendment prohibited negligent supervision claim).
37 See, e.g., Gabriel v. Immanuel Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc., 640 N.E.2d 681 (11. App.
Ct. 1994) (holding that breach of contract complaint was properly dismissed on First Amendment
grounds since the matter of whether to employ plaintiff as a parochial school teacher was an
ecclesiastical issue into which civil court may not inquire); McEnroy v. St. Meinrad Sch. Of
Theology, 713 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (dismissing claim for breach of employment
contract brought by professor of theology against seminary); Basich v. Board of Pensions, 540
N.W.2d 82 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that First Amendment prevented district court from
exercising jurisdiction over action for breach of pension contract and breach of fiduciary duty);
Pearson v. Church of God, 458 S.E.2d 68, 71-72 (S.C. C. App. 1995) (holding that trial court did nt
have constitutional authority to decide claim for breach of contract).
38 See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (in trial for mail fraud, the truth or
falsity of a religious belief may not be the subject of scrutiny by ajury).
39 See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am. 83 F.3d 455, 464-65 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding EEOC
investigation

into

Catholic nun's

Title VII gender discrimination

claim was barred

by

Establishment Clause); Himaka v. Buddhist Churches of Am., 917 F. Supp. 698, 708-09 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (holding that minister's Title VII retaliation claim should be dismissed based upon excessive
governmental entanglement with religion in violation ofEstablishment Clause); Van Osdol v. Vogt,
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civil authorities, including the courts, are admonished to avoid
classifications in legislation or case law which cause an official to
determine whether a religious belief or practice is "central" (i.e., high
degree of importance) to a claimant's religion. 40
A doctrine's
"centrality" is an inherently religious question over which courts have
4

nojurisdiction. I

There is some confusion by courts and commentators concerning
whether these subject-matter dismissals are to be attributed to the
Establishment or Free Exercise Clause, with some courts "papering
over" the dilemma by not attributing either clause but citing the First
Amendment generally. The confusion is excusable and certainly the
free-exercise concerns of religious organizations are implicated in some
of these cases, 42 but the subject matter dismissals make sense only when
attributed to an Establishment Clause viewed as a structural "negation"
ofjudicial power.

908 P.2d 1122, 1130-33 (Colo. 1996) (holding that Establishment Clause insulated a religious
institution's choice of minister from judicial review; Title VII claim against church was properly
dismissed); Geraci v. Eckankar, 526 N.W.2d 391, 399-400 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (gender
discrimination claim by pastor against her church is barred by Establishment Clause).
40 See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)
(rejecting free-exercise test that "depend[s] on measuring the effects of a governmental action on
a religious objector's spiritual development"); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982)
(rejecting government's argument that free-exercise claim does not lie unless "payment of social
security taxes will ... threaten the integrity of the Amish religious belief or observance"); Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981) (rejecting what other cases have called a "centrality"
inquiry); seeCity of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513 (1997) (same); Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990) (same).
41 It is a violation of the Establishment Clause for courts to be compelled by legislative
classification to make inquiry into the religious significance of the words or practices of religious
organizations. See, e.g., Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v. Carver, 770 A.2d 111 (Md. Ct. App. 2001)
(striking down as unconstitutional civil rights employment ordinance that required determination
concerning whether employee performed "purely religious functions").
42 Cases involving church splits often pit the religious freedom of the collective church against
the religious liberty of a dissenting individual or individuals within the church. The Free Exercise
Clause, which is about individual religious rights, cannot solve this conflict-of-rights. The courts
side with the collective church by dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Only a

structural Establishment Clause can explain that result. See Esbeck, StructuralRestraint, supra note
16, at 51-58.
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E. Two-Definitions-of-Religion Puzzle
The Supreme Court has impliedly adopted two definitions of
religion, one for the Establishment Clause and another for the Free
Exercise Clause. 43 This is puzzling, because the word "religion" appears
only once in the text of the First Amendment, applicable to both
clauses. 44
Assume a church, as an outworking of its faith, opens a shelter for
victims of domestic violence. When faced with a municipal order to
cease operation because of noncompliance with certain zoning
ordinances, the church responds by asserting that the shelter's
operation is protected by the Free Exercise Clause because the work is
an outgrowth of its religious beliefs. The claim is obviously plausible
and, if sincere, will be recognized by the courts as satisfying one of the
threshold requirements for stating a claim by coming within the Free
Exercise Clause's definition of "religion." Six months later the city itself
opens a domestic shelter. Is the city now "establishing" religion by
engaging in religious activity? Common sense says "no," yet how can the
identical activity be religious when conducted by a church but not
religious when performed by the municipality?45 The Supreme Court's
43 Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6, at 828 (1st ed. 1978); William
W. Van Alstyne, ConstitutionalSeparation Of Church And State: The Quest ForA Coherent Position,57 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 865, 873-75 (1963); Note, Toward a ConstitutionalDefinition of Religion, 91 HARV. L.

REV. 1056 (1978); but cf Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6, at 1186 n.53
(2d ed. 1988) (criticizing two-definitions approach advocated in the first edition).
44 In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947),Justice Rutledge wrote of the text of the
First Amendment:
"Religion" appears only once in the Amendment. But the word governs two
prohibitions and governs them alike. It does not have two meanings, one
narrow to forbid "an establishment" and another, much broader, for securing
the "free exercise thereof." "Thereof' brings down "religion" with its entire
and exact content, no more and no less, from the first into the second
guaranty, so that Congress and now the states are as broadly restricted
concerning the one as they are regarding the other.
Id. at 32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
45 This illustration is not explained by simply arguing that there are two different purposes for
operating the shelters (one religious and the other secular), rather than two definitions of religion.
The government does not circumvent the Establishment Clause simply by claiming a secular
purpose behind its actions. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam); Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). Many a statutory scheme, notwithstanding ajudical finding of a
secular purpose, has fallen to the clause because the statute had the effect of advancing religion or
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response, without specifically stating so, has been that the same activity
is religious for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause but not religious
46
for purposes of the Establishment Clause.
The Court's approach is not objectionable-indeed, seems to
naturally follow-when the Establishment Clause is conceptualized as
structural. The logic is tied to the difference in tasks between rights
and structure. The task of an individual-rights clause, such as the Free
Exercise Clause, is that the political majority should adjust its police
power objectives to the needs of the religious minority or
nonconformist. Thus, the Free Exercise Clause's meaning of "religion"
is necessarily broad to account for the vast differences in religious
belief-for human hearts vary widely in spiritual matters.
In contrast, the task of a structural clause is to manage sovereign
power. If the Establishment Clause is structural, it lays down a powerlimiting restraint on the proper scope of government. America's
religious pluralism, however, virtually guarantees that legislation, even
when nondiscriminatory in both text and purpose, will have disparate
effects across the spectrum of religions dotting the land. When such
inevitable but unintended effects occur, it would make no sense for the
disparate impact on some religions to force an "as applied" invalidation
due to the legislation in question exceeding the government's power.
This follows, because intrinsic to the structure of a government, the
architecture of which is set out in a written constitution, is that the
powers delegated to, and withheld from, government remain fixed or
constant. Hence, a structural clause cannot be seen as varying in the
scope of its delegation or "negation" of power. That is, a structural
clause, unlike a rights clause, cannot be seen as adjusting case-by-case to
the needs of different religions. If the Establishment Clause is
structural, then any definition of "religion" would have to remain
unvarying and thereby help demarcate the boundary at which the
government's power comes to an end and the purview of religion

unduly entangling itself therewith. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
46 For example, in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442-45 (1961) Sunday closing statutes
were regarded as secular labor laws for Establishment Clause analysis. But a Sunday day of rest was
determined to be religious for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause in Frazee v. Illinois Departmentof

Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989). Likewise, a law restricting access to abortion was regarded
as secular for purposes of the Establshment Clause in Harrisv. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980),
but a woman having unrestricted access to abortion was a matter of religiously informed
conscience for purposes of Free Exercise Clause analysis. Id. at 320-21.
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begins. Were that not so, the church/state boundary would be in
47
constant flux.
The case law shows that this is indeed how the Establishment Clause
has been construed, as if it is structural in character. The Supreme
Court has said that legislation was not violative of the Establishment
Clause just because the law had a disparate impact, beneficial or
detrimental, on particular religions. 48 For the Supreme Court, it has
been sufficient that the legislation has had, interalia,a secular purpose,
and the criteria for what is "secular" has been answered using a narrow,
fixed definition of "religion."
F. ProtectingReligion From Itself

The Supreme Court has struck down aid to religious schools reciting,
as one of its rationales, that government aid would be harmful to the
schools. This occurs although the religious schools themselves actively
seek the aid and insist that they will gladly waive any supposed
constitutional right to not be harmed in this way. For example, in
Lemon v. Kurtzman49 the Court warned about what can happen if a

47 In addition, any definition of religion for Establishment Clause purposes would have to be
narrowed to inherently religious matters, lest the clause overturn social welfare and moral-based
legislation.

For example, in the foregoing illustration it would be absurd to regard a city's

domestic violence shelter as "an establishment of religion." While domestic violence shelters can
be operated out of religious motive, the shelters also have a moral or humantarian basis and thus
are not inherently religious.
48 It is well-settled that when a law of secular purpose has an adverse impact on some religions
but not on others, the Establishment Clause is not violated.

See e.g., Hernandez v. Comm'r of

Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989) (holding IRS regulation concerning deductibility of
contributions having unintended impact on religious groups that barely rely on sales of goods or
services as means of fund raising is not violative of Establishment Clause); Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.30 (1983) (finding that preference for religions whose tenets do
not oppose interracial marriage was the unintended effect of neutral IRS regulation about racially
discriminatory schools, hence the regulation did not violate the Establishment Clause); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. at 319-20 (a law restricting access to abortion was regarded as secular for the
purposes of the Establishment Clause); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 442-45 (Sunday closing
statutes were regarded as secular labor laws for Establishment Clause analysis); see also Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 n.23 (1982) (distinguishing laws that intentionally discriminate among
religions and are thereby unconstitutional from laws that merely have a "disparate impact" on
certain religions and thus do not violate the Establishment Clause).
49 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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religious school qualifies for state aid and thus must comply with the
accompanying regulation:
This kind of state inspection and evaluation of the
religious content of a religious organization is fraught
with the sort of entanglement that the Constitution
forbids. It is a relationship pregnant with dangers of
excessive government direction of church schools and
hence of churches. The Court noted "the hazards of
government supporting churches" in Walz v. Tax
Commission... and we cannot ignore here the danger
that pervasive modern governmental power will
ultimately intrude on religion and thus conflict with
50
Religion Clauses.
That government regulation sometimes can be harmful to a school,
including a religious school, is unremarkable. However, that no-aid
separationists, suing as taxpayers who otherwise have no involvement
with, or interest in, the religious schools, are allowed to seek an
injunction against the government program on the basis that the aid
will be harmful to the schools is, at first blush, counterintuitive.
Counterintuitive, that is, if the Establishment Clause is a constitutional
right protecting the plaintiff/taxpayers. If no-establishment is a rights
clause, then the object of the lawsuit has to be preventing the
government from harming the plaintiffs-the only harm plaintiffs have
standing to raise-not harming the schools.
If no-establishment is structural, however, then the Court's concern
for harming the religious schools is entirely proper. A structural
violation means that the government has exceed its power. In this
context, it means that the government has transgressed into domain
solely within the competence of religion and religious organizations.
When government exceeds its authority, it is entirely possible that
program regulations undermine religious autonomy.
We see that it may be that no one is harmed when there is a
misbalance in the roles of church and state, as in Flast v. Cohen. Or, as
we also have seen, the harm may be non-religious, such as the
abridgement of academic freedom in Epperson v. Arkansas.51 Or, the
50 Id. at 620 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970)).
51 393 U.S. 97 (1968)

(striking down a state law prohibiting the teaching of the theory of
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harm may be in the nature of a religious "offense" and befall either the
plaintiff, as in Lee v. Weisman,52 or the third-party/school, as indicated in
the quote above from Lemon v. Kurtzman. That is characteristic of
structural violations: the resulting harm can befall no one, result in
harm that is non-religious, or produce a remedy for those in the "zone
of impact" whether or not they consider themselves harmed. From the
viewpoint of the Lemon Court, religious schools are in the "zone of
impact" protected from the government's over regulation of the
schools' religious briefs and practices. This conception of the
constitutional wrong makes sense, but only if the Establishment Clause
is structural. The remedy-which may be quite unrelated to plaintiffs
actual harm-is aimed at getting the government back within the
bounds of its competency.
G. The Non-DelegationRule

The Establishment Clause can be analogized to a Separation of
Powers clause, except that the no-establishment restraint runs only
against the state rather than a two-way balance, one both checking and
empowering the church and the state. In cases such as Kedroff v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral, the Establishment Clause worked to keep the
prerogatives vested in religious organizations from being undermined
by legislation that purported to shift ecclesiastical control from one
church hierarchy to another. The logical corollary is the rule of nondelegation that emerges from Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.53 In Larkin,

the Establishment Clause operated to keep certain sovereign powers
from being delegated to a church. It is, of course, far more common
for government to exceed its power (e.g., as in Kedrof]) than it is to
improperly delegate away its power (e.g., as in Larkin).
In Larkin, a state enacted a zoning statute that sought to protect
houses of worship, schools, and hospitals from the tumult of close
proximity to taverns and bars. Under the statute, when a proprietor
applying for a liquor license selected a site within 500 feet of a house of
worship, the affected church, synagogue, or mosque was notified and

evolution in public schools).
52 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding unconstitutional public school sponsorship of clergy-led
prayers during graduation ceremonies and granting class-wide relief to graduating student and her
family, who's attendance was voluntary, and who were "offended" by recital of any and all prayer).
53 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
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permitted to veto the license's issuance.5 4 By granting a veto over
licenses, the law placed into ecclesiastical hands a civil power over a
matter of commerce. The immediate harm to the tavern owner was
pecuniary, not religious. In a larger sense, however, church and state
must be in right balance to the mutual benefit of both the church and
the body politic. Here, said the Court, the transfer of civil power, if not
arrested at this early stage, could evolve over time into "political
oppression through a union of civil and ecclesiastical control. '55 This
rule of non-delegation, which is about preventing religious
organizations from acquiring powers properly vested in government
alone, is possible to explain only if the Establishment Clause is regarded
as structural in nature.
H. Conflict in the Clauses
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits intentional discrimination against
a particular religion or religion in general, 56 as well as targeting specific
religious beliefs and practices. 57 The current practice in the courts is to
regard compliance with the Establishment Clause as a duty that, if
applicable, is a "compelling interest" overriding the commands of the
Free Exercise Clause. 58 This makes no sense. The Supreme Court's
54 1,.117-21.
55 Id. at 127 n.10.
56 SeeChurch of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (striking
down ordinances that intentionally discriminated against Santeria religious practice of animal
sacrifice); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (striking down state constitutional clause that
intentionally discriminated against clerics seeking elective public office).
57
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits more thanjust intentional discrimination on the basis of
religion or religious affiliation. The clause also prohibits intentional discrimination on the basis of
a particular religious belief or practice. Government may not "impose special disabilities on the
basis of religious views or religious status," Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990), or
regulate the slaughter of small animals "because it is undertaken for religious reasons," Lukuini,
508 U.S. at 532.
58 For examples of lower federal courts confronting this clauses-in-conflict argument, see Peter
d

v. Wedl, 155 F.3d 992, 996-97 (8 ' Cir. 1998) (affirming lower court's ruling that both the Free
Exercise and Free Speech Clauses are violated by a Minnesota regulation that provided aid to
special education students except where the student was enrolled in a religious school; the court
concluded that the regulatory exemption was purposefully discriminatory on the basis of religion
and not required by the Establishment Clause); Hartman v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973 (6' Cir. 1995)
(striking down, as violative of the Free Exercise Clause, a United States Army regulation that
extended benefits to secular day-care centers but discriminated against faith-based centers chosen
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"pervasively sectarian" test 59 is illustrative of the problem. The test
causes state educational bureaucracies to discriminate against religious
schools found to be "pervasively sectarian." 60 Conceding, as they must,
that such intentional discrimination is primafacieviolative of the Free
Exercise Clause, no-aid separationists respond by putting the Free
Exercise Clause at war with the Establishment Clause. They do'so by
arguing clauses-in-conflict and urge that the clash be resolved by the noestablishment principle overriding free exercise. The imagined conflict
is brought about by conceptualizing the Establishment Clause as
securing an individual right to a "freedom from the religion" of others.
And the Free Exercise Clause doubtlessly secures some constitutional
right in these "others" to exercise their religion. With the issue so
framed, then of course the two rights will not infrequently be on a
collision course. 61 The resulting "conflict," no-aid separationists
propose, is to be relieved by tipping the "balance" in the direction of
their view of the Establishment Clause. One could just as easily-and
just as arbitrarily-assume that the duty to comply with the Free
Exercise Clause overrides the no-establishment principle.
Arguing a clash-of-the-clauses is to advance the wholly improbable:
that the First Congress drafted the First Amendment with two
by the parents; the government's discrimination, concluded the court, was not required by the
Establishment Clause).
59 The "pervasively sectarian" test first surfaced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614-22
(1971). The last two cases where the Court struck down governmental aid using the test are Grand
Rapids Sch. Diit. v. Ball 473 U.S. 373 (1985), and Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).

However,

Ball was recently discredited and partly overruled in Agoslini and Aguilar was overruled in its
entirety. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226-35 (1997).
60 Such discrimination pressures faith-based educational providers to compromise their
spirituality to prevent losing opportunities for state funding. Hence, the current system makes
comprehensive government funding programs relentless engines of secularization.
61 Professo Meiklejohn notes the analytical difficulty when the religion text of the First
Amendment is invoked to do service as both protecting religious liberty and affording a freedom
from religion:
[A] I1discussions of the First Amendment are tormented by the fact that the
term "freedom of religion" must be used to cover "freedom of nonreligion" as
well. Such a paradoxical usage cannot fail to cause serious difficulties, both
theoretical and practical.
Alexander Meiklejohn, EducationalCooperation Between Church and State, 14 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 61, 71 (1949).
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fundamental provisions side-by-side each trying to cancel out the other.
The two clauses seemingly tugging in opposite directions leaves broad
discretion to the courts to "balance" one right against the other, thereby
having to choose between them. There is, however, no principled basis
on which the courts can create a sliding scale of constitutional values,
62
with free exercise less "valuable" than no-establishment or vice versa.
The clauses-in-conflict argument is neither consistent with the First
Amendment's text (neither the Free Exercise Clause nor Establishment
Clause states it has primacy over the other), nor are such conflicts
intrinsic to the clauses and thereby logically unavoidable. The Free
Exercise Clause is a right running in favor of individuals, which, on a
case-by-case basis, has the effect of limiting government power. The
Establishment Clause, if viewed as structural, is a restraint running
against the government, which has the direct object of limiting
government power. To be sure, the two clauses overlap at certain
points and thus compliment one another, 63 but the supposed "tension"
goes away when the Establishment Clause is not viewed as a right to be
"free from the religion" of others.

wV.
To systematize the Supreme Court's cases around a view of the
Establishment Clause as a structural "negative" on government power
over inherently religious subject matters will reduce considerably the
confusion in legal doctrine. This will yield a more clear and consistent
application of the law, and citizens will better understand their rights
and government officials their limits.

62 SeeValley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982) (" [W]e know
of no principled basis on which to create a hierarchy of constitutional values ... to invoke the
judicial power of the United States.").
63 There are situations when a single incident can properly give rise to meritorious claims
under both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. But this is a complementary situation,
and not a clash of the clauses. To illustrate, assume a public school adopted a regulation requiring
that the Lord's Prayer be led by teachers and recited by students at the beginning of each
classroom day. A third grade Islamic student, along with all others, is compelled to recite the
prayer.

As a Muslim, the student has suffered a personal religious harm for which the Free

Exercise Clause gives individual relief. The student could also bring a cause of action under the
Establishment Clause, leading to injunctive relief against continued school-wide enforcement of
the prayer regulation.
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There is also a strategic value to such a realignment. A structural noestablishment, as it labors to keep government within its bounds, does
lead to more open space for the exercise of everyone's liberties,
including religious liberty. Thus, the Establishment Clause, properly
understood, affords another constitutional argument on behalf of
religious freedom. Given the cut-back in free-exercise protection as a
consequence of the decision in Employment Division v. Smith, this should
be welcomed by civil libertarians. An example of where this may be
happening already is with developments in tort and employment
nondiscrimination law. Cases such Watson v. Jones64 and Serbian E.
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,65 taught in law school curricula as a
backwater line of precedent labeled "intra-church disputes," are newly
being applied to defend religious organizations sued in "clergy
malpractice" 66 or raised as explaining the "ministerial exemption" to
employment nondiscrimination lawsuits. 67 This is encouraging, and it is
only regrettable that it took the Smith decision trimming back on freeexercise rights to cause a rediscovery of how no-establishment restraints
protect religion.
Then there is the conceptual problem of explaining why a religious
exemption to general regulatory or tax legislation is not a "religious
preference" violative of the Establishment Clause. Our nation has a
long history at all governmental levels of exemptions from general
regulations that expressly exclude religious practices or religious
organizations. With increasing frequency these exemptions are
64 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871) (holding that court will not interfere in disputes over religious
doctrine, discipline, or polity, but will defer to the resolution by the highest church adjudicative
body).
65 426 U.S. 696, 713-17 (1976) (holding that civil courts generally may not probe into disputes
over church polity or the removal of ecclesiastics).
66 See,e.g., Abrams v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of NewYork, Inc., 715 N.E.2d 798 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1999) (dismissing claim by church member for wrongful dismissal from church);
Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne - South Bend Diocese, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 253 (Ind. App. Ct. 1999)
(dismissing claim for defamation brought by former pastor who was removed from her
ecclesiastical

appointment); O'Connor v. Diocese of Honolulu, 885 P.2d 361 (Haw. 1994)

(dismissing claim by Catholic newspaper publisher for wrongful excommunication).
67 See, e.g., EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 800-02 (4' Cir.
2000) (dismissing Tide VII gender discrimination claim by minister of music filed against church);
Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 186-87 (9' Cir. 1994)
(dismissing Title VII gender discrimination claim by minister for failure of church to appoint her
as elder and for removal of her ministerial status).

HeinOnline -- 18 J.L. & Pol. 472 2002

2002]

Establishment Clause As A StructuralRestraint

challenged as "preferences" that advance religion, 68 but the Supreme
Court has rebuffed the argument. Corporationof the PresidingBishop v.
70
Amos, 69 is the most recent in a long line of cases in the high court.

From the perspective of a structural Establishment Clause, these
exemptions are the government merely refraining from imposing a
regulatory burden with respect to a subject matter arguably in the sole
competence of religion or religious organizations. Seen in that light,
the government does not prefer or establish religion by leaving it
alone. 7 1 For government to not impose on religious claimants legal
burdens on private religious choices no more unconstitutionally favors
religion than does the Free Exercise Clause unconstitutionally favor
religion. 72 Indeed, these religious exemptions are desirable because
they reinforce a healthy separation of church and state.
68 See, e.g., E. Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California, 13 P.3d 1122 (Cal. 2000) (finding that
ordinance landmarking historic properties that exempted historic sites held by churches and other
religious organizations was not violative of the Establishment Clause).
69 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
Amos upheld a religious discrimination exemption for religious
organizations in federal civil rights legislation. "[I]t is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate
significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry
out their missions."

Id. at 335. Amos also makes it clear that for a government to refrain from

"imposing a burden" is logically no different from "lifting a burden" imposed in the past. In Amos,
a burden first imposed in 1964 was lifted in 1972. See al'oWallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
70 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding property tax exemption for
religious organizations); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding release-time from
compulsory education laws for students to attend religious exercises off public school grounds);
The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918)

(upholding, inter alia, military service

exemptions for clergy and theology students); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)
(religious exemption from military draft for those who oppose all war does not violate
Establishment Clause); but seeTexas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(disallowing sales tax exemption which was available only on purchases of sacred religious
literature).
71 To establish a religion connotes that a government must have taken some affirmative action
to seek to achieve the prohibited result ("... . shall make no law...."). Conversely, for government
to passively leave religion where it found it logically cannot be making a law respecting an
establishment of religion. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 ("For a law to have forbidden 'effects' under
Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government itsel(has advanced religion through its own activities
and influence."). Additionally, to reduce civil and religious tensions and minimize church and
state interaction, both consequences of exemptions, are matters that enhance the separation
sought by the Establishment Clause.
72 AsJustice White observed while dissenting in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970),
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The no-endorsement test has long been criticized as indeterminate
and subjective. 73 The censure is well deserved. More fundamentally,
however, the endorsement test fails because it attempts to turn the
Establishment Clause into an individual right to be "free from the
religion" of others. That "right" is said to be a freedom not to feel
alienated in one's civic standing on account of religion. 74 Setting up a
right, protected by the Establishment Clause, from civic alienation due
to a perceived lessor status in the political community invites inevitable
conflict with the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses.7 5 As described
above, this pseudo "conflict-in-the-clauses" is one of the principal reasons
for confusion in First Amendment case law and cannot be remotely
justified by the text or canons of construction. The no-establishment
principle as a structural clause avoids all those problems, and has the
added virtue of giving yet one more powerful reason to bury, once and
for all, the no-endorsement test.
Finally, a structural Establishment Clause explains and reinforces a
long series of cases by the Supreme Court to the effect that government
authorities must avoid classifications that cause officials to probe into
the religious meaning of words, practices, and events.

76

Typical would

the Free Exercise Clause is itself a law that by its express terms exempts religion from certain civil
burdens. Any law that purposefully exempts religion from a civil duty-such as the Free Exercise
Clause-cannot possibly violate the Establishment Clause, for then the latter clause would cancel
out the former. Therefore, without more, it must be an appropriate legislative purpose to allow
individuals and religious organizations

to make

private religious

choices unimpeded

by

governmental burdens placed on others.
73 See Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and DoctrinalIllusionv.: EstablishnentNeutrality and the
"No Endor mnent" Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266 (1987); Jesse Choper, infra, this symposium issue ofJ.
of Law & Politics.
74 SeeWallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 30, 69 (1985) (O'Connor,J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor,J., concurring). The concurring opinion in LynchwasJustice
O'Connor's first promulgation of her no-endorsement test.
75 ConpareJustice Scalia's plurality opinion in Capitol Square v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763-70
(1995) (criticizing application of no-endorsement test to public forum situations), with id. at 772,
774-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (balancing free-speech rights of private speakers against noendorsement test).
76 See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987) and id. at 344-45
(Brennan,J., concurring) (recognizing a problem when government attempts to divine whichjobs
are sufficiently related to the core of a religious organization so as to merit exemption from
statutory duties); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.30 (1983)

(avoiding

potentially entangling inquiry into religious practice); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16
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be Rosenbergerv. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,77 where the
majority observed that a state university should avoid public forum
access policies that cause school authorities to have to distinguish
between evangelism, on the one hand, and the expression of ideas
merely approved by a given religion, on the other. 78 Similarly, in
Widmar v. Vincent 79 the Court rejected a suggestion that civil authorities
could, consistent with the First Amendment, distinguish between
The
speech as worship and all other types of religious speech. 80
the lack of judicial competence to resolve
concern is threefold:
doctrinal questions, the potential for interference by the state in
religious affairs, and the potential for "establishment" when a court
favors one religious interpretation of words or events over others.
Certainly these restraints on the power of officials to classify inherently
religious matters are far easier to explain if the Establishment Clause is
viewed as structural. This also explains the plurality's opinion in
Mitchell v. Helms,81 to the effect that the "pervasively sectarian" test is
both offense to religious sensibilities and in conflict with another line of
(1981) (not within judicial function or competence to resolve religious differences); Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437,450 (1971) (Congress permitted to accommodate "all war" pacifists but
not 'Just war" inductees because to broaden the exemption invites increased church-state
entanglements and would render almost impossible the fair and uniform administration of
selective service system); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (avoiding entanglement
that would follow should tax authorities evaluate the temporal worth of religious social welfare
programs is desirable); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305-07 (1940) (petty officials not to
be given discretion to determine what is a legitimate "religion" for purposes of issuing permit); see
also Rusk v. Espinosa, 456 U.S. 951 (1982) (affd inein.) (striking down charitable solicitation
ordinance that required officials to distinguish between "spiritual" and secular purposes underlying
solicitation by religious organizations); United States v. Christian Echoes Ministry, 404 U.S. 561,
564-65 (1972) (percuriamn) (holding that IRS could not appeal directly to Supreme Court the ruling
of a federal district court to the effect that the IRS's redetermination of§ 501(c) (3) exempt status
was done in a manner violative of rights of admittedly religious organization; IRS had sought to
examine all of religious organization's activities and characterize them as either "religious" or
"political" and, if political, then "non-religious").
17 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (university should avoid distinguishing between evangelism, on the one
hand, and the expression of ideas merely approved by a given religion).
78 1d. at 843-44.
79

454 U.S. 263 (1981).
80 Id. at 269-70 n.6, 272 n.l (holding that inquires into the religious significance of words or
events are to be avoided).
81 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion) (upholding federal aid to education programs at K12 schools, including religious schools).
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the Court's cases. The "pervasively sectarian" test, said the plurality,
results in civil magistrates "trolling through" the activities of religious
organizations.8 2 Behind this line of cases that prohibit officials from
attributing religious meaning to the words and activities of religious
organizations is the idea that the government is restrained from dealing
with subject matter that is inherently religious. This is a healthy
conceptualization of church/state separation, and should be
encouraged.
CONCLUSION

For the most part this paper looks only at what the modern Supreme
Court has actually done with the Establishment Clause. There is no
attempt here to divine what the First Congress in 1789 meant by the
words "make no law respecting an establishment of religion," or what
the ratifying state legislatures thought was the text's meaning during
their debates in 1789-1791. However, history is referenced in one
respect, namely, that church/state relations in the West have responded
to the religion question at two levels: the scope of state power vis-a-vis
the church and the state's regard for religious persons. Accordingly, it
is not surprising that the two religion clauses in the First Amendment
came to shoulder the jurisprudence that answers these two
relationships, with no-establishment bearing the law of the state's
relationship to organized religion and free-exercise bearing the law of
the state's relationship to individuals of faith.
The U.S. Supreme Court, at least since the 1947 decision in Everson
v. Board of Education, has treated the Establishment Clause as a
structural restraint on governmental power. This is evident, not from
the Court's stated rationale in its cases, but from how it actually regards
the clause-as one running against the government and limiting its
power when it comes to treading on subject matters that are inherently
religious. The validations or "proofs" compile a tidy list, from special
standing rules for federal taxpayers to making sense of how the Court
can think it unconstitutional for a religious organization to receive state
82 See id. at 827-29. The "trolling through" perspective as limiting governmental jurisdiction
was followed in University of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir., 2002), holding that the
NLRB does not have jurisdiction over a religious college and that the Board may not apply the
"substantial religious character" test to determine that the college is or is not sufficiently religious
to be protected by First Amendment.
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aid because the aid will, in the long run, undermine the religious
autonomy of the organization.
Although there are a few outlier decisions, 3 if one looks only at
results rather than rationale, most of the Court's no-establishment
decisions fit within this manner of systemizing the cases. That is
progress, enabling both practitioner and commentator to move beyond
tossing in the air one's hands and announcing the cases in hopeless
disarray. The outcome of litigation can become more predictable and
uniform, and, equally important, thereby more acceptable to the
public.

83 See, e.g.,
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (finding that city practice of displaying
nativity of Jesus and Holy Family as part of Christmas holiday scene did not violate noestablishment); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding state legislature's practice of
hiring chaplain to offer prayers in chamber at beginning of daily session);Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S.
595 (1979) (holding that state courts may, at its discretion, adopt "neutral principles of law" as a
means of adjudicating intra-church disputes in lieu of judicial deference to highest church
adjudicative authority).
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